FREE INTERNATIONAL TRADE rests on the principle of comparative advantage. By engaging in trade, a nation can benefit from specializing in the production of goods in which it is relatively more efficient and exchanging them for those in which other nations excel. Provided its cost levels are appropriately adjusted by exchange rate changes or monetary flows, the nation will be sufficiently competitive to pay for its import needs. Over time, comparative advantage may shift, however, and in principle an economy might lose its comparative advantage in an entire sector. Indeed, it is widely believed that the U.S. manufacturing sector is in the process of just such a decline-developed countries have become increasingly competitive with U.S. firms at the upper end of the technology spectrum while developing countries have penetrated the markets of those firms making more standardized products.
3. I implicitly assume a unitary elasticity of demand when applying this procedure to measure the import-competitive effects. of some other industry.6 Finally, any years chosen as the basis for comparison are likely to have some peculiar characteristics that could affect the conclusions of the analysis. Accordingly, whenever possible, comparisons are reported for a number of different periods. Table 1 shows estimates of value added and employment due to trade and domestic use in U.S. manufacturing for 1970, 1972, 1973, and 1980.7 One can compare 1980 and 1970, years with similar levels of capacity utilization in manufacturing. In 1970, value added related to manufacturing exports was 8.5 percent of overall value added in manufacturing, while the production of manufactured imports at home would have raised value added in manufacturing by 8. 
One attempt to incorporate such interactions is Gene M. Grossman, "The Employment and Wage Effects of Import Competition in the United

A Disaggregated Analysis
Although much of the discussion about U.S. deindustrialization has been about manufacturing as a whole, the discussion in fact corresponds to developments in just a few industries. Tables A-1 and A-2 in the appendix present disaggregated data on value added and employment to illustrate this. Some results in those tables may appear paradoxical. In particular, if employment due to trade in an industry is initially negative, indicating that imports, on balance, are displacing morejobs than exports are creating, then a labor-saving change in value added or productivity will expand employment due to trade by bringing it nearer to zero. 13 The employment shifts reported in table A-2 for 1970-80 reveal several features. First, in a majority (thirty-one of the fifty-two) of the U.S. industrial sectors employment growth was positive; employment due to trade also grew in thirty-one 1-0 sectors. Second, generally the effects of trade on employment were smaller than those due to domestic use: in forty-two of the fifty-two sectors the change due to trade was smaller in absolute magnitude than the change due to domestic use. Third, trade was not the reason for the drop in employment in most of the declining industries. In six of the nine industries in which employment fell more than 10 percent employment due to trade actually increased; only in footwear and apparel was the loss due to trade greater than that due to domestic use. Similarly, employment due to trade increased in fourteen of the twenty-one industries in which overall employment fell: only in three industries-radio and television, motor vehicles, and miscellaneous manufacturing-was a decline due to trade larger than an increase due to domestic use.
From 1973 to 1980 the positive influence of trade was even more widespread-employment due to trade rose in thirty-eight of the fifty-12. Price sensitivity is the major source of the decline in the U.S. manufacturing trade balance from 1980 to 1982.
13. Because of productivity changes, the changes in value added in any sector may be in the reverse direction from the corresponding changes in employment. If value added per employee rises by x percent, value added must rise by x percent simply to keep employment unchanged. two sectors considered. However, overall employment declined in twenty-five of the sectors, primarily because of domestic use. In none of the industries in which total employment declined was a positive effect due to domestic use offset by a negative effect due to trade. Although trade contributed to the employment loss in seven of the twenty-five sectors, the decline due to trade was larger than the decline due to domestic use in only footwear and miscellaneous manufacturing.
For the decade as a whole, an interval over which cyclical variations in demand were unimportant, the automobile industry is virtually the only industry whose experience fits the widely held view that employment declines were due to trade and that without trade, employment would have grown. Even in automobiles, as the International Trade Commission confirms, the major sources of the industry's problems are domestic. As reported in table A The correspondence between growth related to domestic use and growth related to trade can be seen clearly when the fifty-two industries are aggregated according to the nature of the production process. In the trade literature it is customary to group goods into three groups: goods that require the relatively intensive use of natural resources (termed Ricardo goods), goods that require high proportions of research and development or employ scientists and engineers fairly intensively (product-cycle or high-technology goods), and goods that use relatively standardized production technologies (Hecksher-Ohlin goods). In this paper I adopt the Ricardo (resource-intensive) and product-cycle (hightechnology) groupings and divide the Hecksher-Ohlin group according to relative capital-labor ratios into capital-and labor-intensive categories. 16 The data in table 2 
Patterns of Domestic Use: High Technology and Demand
Looking at the detailed data on industries and the product aggregation, one is struck by the degree to which most of the story of structural change can be told simply by looking at the data on domestic use.
Output due to domestic use was weakest in old U.S. industries such as tobacco, wood containers, leather goods, iron and steel, and metal containers. The sectors with the highest increases in domestic use were all high-technology sectors. From 1970 to 1980 several of these industries had increased output due to greater domestic use: for example, output in office, computing, and accounting machines increased 253 percent; electronic components, 219 percent; optical equipment, 123 percent; and plastics, 90 percent. Of the high-technology industries, only aircraft had a negative effect due to domestic use. Thus the patterns associated with the performance of U.S. industrial growth in the 1970s are all present in the data on domestic use: considerably more rapid output gains in high-technology and equipment industries, relatively slower growth in all major process and end-use categories in the 1970s, particularly sluggish performance in U.S. labor-and capital-intensive industries, and weak growth of industries such as leather, wood containers, tobacco products, and metal products. Almost all these developments have been reinforced by the impact of foreign competition, although their directions and general magnitudes would be the same without the effects due to foreign trade.
Explanations of the accelerated shift toward high-technology production since 1972 often cite the influence of foreign trade or a speedup in the pace of technological change. But neither of these explanations seems sufficient. As shown in table 3, the accelerated shift is present even when the effects of trade are excluded. Thus trade is certainly not all of the story. As for faster technological change, table 4 shows that employment, output, and productivity (output per employee) in hightechnology industries grew more slowly from 1973 to 1980 than they did in the 1960s. In fact, as measured by the growth in output per employee, the slowdown in productivity growth in the high-technology industries has been quite similar to the productivity slump elsewhere in manufacturing. This makes it doubtful that faster technological change is the explanation.
What other explanations might account for the relatively strong output gains in high-technology products during 1973-80? One might be the relatively high income-elasticity of demand for these products and the low income-elasticity of demand for older commodities. Wealthy consumers devote declining shares of their incomes to basic needs such as clothing, footwear, furniture, and simple electrical appliances. Conversely, they increase the share devoted to computers, aircraft, and communications equipment. Thus, with the expansion of income, basic commodities can be expected to have declining shares. But if income elasticities have the dominant effect, the share of high-technology industries increases more rapidly in periods of high rather than low income growth. 17 Perhaps, however, it is precisely because income effects were so small during the 1973-80 period that the share of high-technology products has grown. In explaining the demand for a product, it is customary to distinguish between income and substitution effects. In the absence of price declines, because their qualitative nature changes very little, the market for standardized commodities will only expand in 17. If, for example, income growth rates were infinite, commodities with elasticities of less than 1.0 would tend to have zero shares; if growth were zero, shares would remain constant. Thus the more rapid is the growth rate, the faster the shares of products with high income-elasticities expand. the face of income growth. Thus under depressed cyclical conditions the demand for the products of U.S. industries such as textiles, iron, steel, other basic metals, fabricated metals, and automobiles will be particularly sluggish. Income growth is likely to be less important as a determinant of the demand for a new product. It might be possible to increase sales of Sony Walkman radio-earphone sets in the midst of a recession, for example, whereas it is not possible to raise the sales of portable radios. Substitution effects due to price and quality changes are likely to dominate income effects. With the correct hedonic measures, all quality changes theoretically can be appropriately recorded as relative price changes. In reality, however, such adjustments are not made, so it is reasonable to decompose substitution effects into those due to price changes and those due to quality changes. If the relatively more rapid productivity growth in high-technology products resulted in relatively lower prices, and if demand were elastic, this could account for the growth in employment. My use of the deflators at the four-digit SIC level to estimate the relative value-added changes of the end-use categories failed to confirm this hypothesis. When compared with the overall rise in value added for manufactured goods, the natural resource industries had increases of 49 percent in relative unit value added from 1972 to 1980, but both capital-intensive and high-technology products declined about 9 percent each and labor-intensive products, 15 percent. Thus one is left with the hypothesis that changes of a qualitative nature not captured by conven-tional measurement practices account for the resilience in demand for high technology.18 A second source of substitution effects during this period could of course be the demand for more energy-efficient products. The close correspondence between the high-technology and equipment groupings suggests this possibility (see table A over time. As foreign economies have grown more rapidly than the U. S. economy and as they generally have had higher ratios of investment to GNP, the U.S. share of the global capital stock has declined markedly. However, the U.S. share of skilled labor has decreased relatively little, and its share of global arable land has actually increased.21 These changes in relative factor endowments are therefore consistent with the increased U.S. specialization in products that are intensive in skilled labor and land and the decreased specialization in capital-intensive products. 22 A less formal but more dynamic explanation of the pattern of U.S. trade incorporates the role of changes in technological and production capabilities and the growth of economies of scale that accompanied the convergence of foreign nations toward U.S. productivity levels. In the early 1950s the United States dominated global manufacturing capacity. In 1950 the United States produced about 60 percent of the manufactured goods output in the Western industrial countries, and in 1953 it accounted for about 29 percent of the world exports of manufactured goods. In almost every field U.S. firms stood at the technological frontier and enjoyed the economies of scale resulting from access to a large, integrated, and extremely wealthy market. American inventors designed products primarily with a view toward saving labor, and as foreign productivity levels increased and real wages rose these products became increasingly attractive abroad. World War II stimulated technological advances in computers, aircraft, and pharmaceuticals, and although it severely crippled civilian production facilities abroad, in the United States the capital stock remained intact.
The capital goods and chemicals, but by the late 1950s the rebuilding of Europe and the expansion of Japanese exports of textiles eroded the trade surpluses in semimanufactured goods and consumer products. In the mid-1960s foreign steel and automobiles were penetrating the U.S. market in substantial quantities, and the trade balances in semimanufactured products and automobiles became negative. As U.S. imports from the developed nations moved up the technology spectrum, the developing nations began to enter the market and make up increasing shares of U.S. imports of standardized labor-intensive consumer products.
On the one hand, the range of U.S. imports broadened to mirror the different stages of development of its trading partners-with laborintensive imports originating in developing nations and capital-intensive and high-technology products originating in the industrial economies. On the other hand, the range of U.S. exports narrowed, and it became increasingly confined to capital goods, chemical and agricultural products, and services.
In The literature disputes the precise sources of the U.S. advantage in high-technology manufactured goods. Does it result from the relative abundance of engineers and scientists, the relatively large amounts spent on R&D, or the market inducements to innovate in a rich economy? The strong interactions among these factors inhibit quantification of the contribution of each.27 However, it is possible to provide a snapshot of the kinds of manufactured goods the United States succeeds in exporting and those in which import penetration has been the greatest.
U.S. export industries have made large investments in R&D and are at the technological frontier.28 The products are often novel, require specialized production methods, and benefit during their development from being close to the market in which they are sold. Staying ahead requires continual innovation to offset the inevitable standardization of the production process and the international diffusion of technology. Conversely, U.S. imports, especially those from developing countries, are by and large mature and standardized products that can be massproduced using skills that can be quickly acquired. They may be manufactured products requiring unskilled labor (such as apparel and footwear) or products requiring capital relatively intensively (such as steel).
The growing importance of high-technology trade to the United States is illustrated by figure 1, which contrasts To be sure, in some industries the pace of decline during the decade was somewhat more rapid. In the wood containers and leather products industries-the sectors with the greatest employment loss from 1970 to 1980-the declines averaged 3.3 and 2.4 percent a year, respectively. Yet considering the typical rate at which workers voluntarily quit their jobs, even these industries would have been able to cope with a smooth declining employment trend without involuntary layoffs. The problem is that such changes do not occur smoothly; they coincide with the business cycle and may take the form of lumpy plant closures rather than smooth exponential decay.
Recent Experience
Much of the current concern about trade in manufactured products in particular and structural change in general stem not from the trends of the 1970s, but from the much sharper effects on manufacturing industries A return to the long-run employment trend by 1990 would entail average annual employment gains during 1982-90 of 2.5 and 1.5 percent a year in high-and low-technology manufacturing, respectively. In summary, employment in manufacturing has fallen considerably below its long-run trend. Given reasonable economic expansion and international price competitiveness, structural change should now be relatively easy to accommodate in the remainder of the 1980s. 
Employment Growth and High Technology
Would the current job losers from the low-technology industries be employable in high-technology industry? To some degree, those displaced will find employment in other sectors of the economy. The issue of structural mismatch across manufacturing remains, however. In particular, there has been concern about the distributional effects of changes in the structure of U.S. manufacturing trade.34 Some major characteristics of workers in high-and low-technology industries are shown in table 5. An examination of the averages reported in the table suggests differences that might be expected: workers in high-technology industries tend to be more highly paid, better educated, male, white, younger, and less unionized than their low-technology counterparts.35 The differences in regional location and occupation characteristics between high-and low-technology workers generally are surprisingly small.36 This suggests that most of the workers could be employed in either sector.
The unionized. Fourth, both employers and employees have considerable financial incentives to resist change. Workers earn large wage premiums that reflect advantages such as seniority benefits, monopoly rents, and the support of strong unions that they would not receive if employed elsewhere.38 And employers have invested unusually large amounts of capital per worker. In most of these respects the computer industry is strikingly different. Its work force has considerably more white, female, educated, and young workers; it is much less unionized and is heavily concentrated in the western part of the United States. Thus if the "structural problem" of the reemployment of U.S. labor involves hiring automobile workers to build computers, as conventional wisdom appears to presume, the problem appears considerable. If, however, it involves a gradual replacement of low-technology jobs with high-technology jobs, it seems far more manageable. Considering that in November 1982 unemployed workers from primary metals and automobiles, many of whom are likely to be recalled, constituted, respectively, about 2.5 and 2.1 percent of total U.S. unemployment (and 9.1 and 7.7 percent of unemployment in manufacturing), the problems for these industries, while substantial for the individuals and firms involved, are a relatively small part of the overall story of U.S. manufacturing.39
Conclusions
In the 1970s the share of manufacturing employment in total U.S. employment continued its secular decline as a consequence of the revealed preference of U.S. consumers for services and the more rapid increase of productivity in the manufacturing sector.
Overall, U.S. industrial growth in the 1970s was sluggish but was almost precisely what would have been expected, given the slow growth The increase in U.S. manufacturing output since 1973 was about the same as the average of all industrial countries, and more rapid than in West Germany, France, and the United Kingdom. Although employment in U.S. manufacturing grew modestly, in every other major industrial market economy it declined. In fact, in virtually every major manufacturing sector employment in the United States grew faster than in Japan. In contrast to the U.S. experience, the share of total investment devoted to the manufacturing sector has declined in every major West European country. Although U. S. labor productivity growth in manufacturing was not as rapid as in other industrial countries, U.S. productivity levels in overall manufacturing remain the highest in the world. of slow domestic growth, the domestic markets for those products have not expanded rapidly. But the U.S. comparative advantage in manufactured high-technology products has strengthened while the demand for high-technology products has grown relatively more rapidly in a climate of stagnation. In general, however, structural change in the U.S. economy during this period arose mostly from domestic factors.
In contrast to the performance in the 1970s, from 1980 to 1982 foreign trade contributed to the employment decline in manufacturing. The drop in employment due to exports was about a third of the total fall in employment in manufacturing. The recent developments should not be interpreted as a sudden diminution of U.S. comparative advantage in manufacturing, however. Rather, they are the direct consequence of the substantial erosion of the price competitiveness of U.S. products associated with the real appreciation of the U.S. dollar. While employment in high-technology industries has declined less rapidly than in lowtechnology industries in the current recession, the relation has been typical of recession behavior. Employment in both sectors should increase significantly with recovery from the recession. demand has served to reduce the declines in employment that would have occurred on the basis of domestic uses alone. Apart from drawing attention to this central result, I make five observations: two on possible extensions of the paper, two on the possible qualifications to the paper, and one on a somewhat surprising apparent result in the paper and the possible reason for it.
APPENDIX
Detailed Technical Data for Estimates and Classification Scheme
The possible extensions involve both time and space. The first suggestion is to extend Lawrence's analysis backward in time, to cover the 1960s. Tables 2 and 4 give glimpses of the differences between the 1960s and the 1970s, and the glimpses are consistent with Lawrence's claim that the main difference between the two decades was the rate of growth of overall demand, with little difference in the rate at which the structure of manufacturing changed. In other words, structural change in U.S. manufacturing was no greater in the 1970s than it was in the 1960s, once one corrects for overall demand. This is a strong and unconventional conclusion if substantiated by more detailed analysis, in particular by correcting for a change in the exchange rate, a point to which I return below.
A Being deeply skeptical of the contention that capital and energy are complements, whereas labor and energy are substitutes, I cannot conclude that Lawrence's calculations are biased in any obvious way, except toward energy and the capital involved directly in the production of energy. But that deserves more attention than he has given to it: in any case, the effects will be discovered when new input-output coefficients become available.
My final observation focuses on table 5 and the problems of aggregation involved in studying the influence of technology on trade. Table 5 shows that the employees in low-technology industries are older and less well educated than those in high-technology industries, as is commonly believed. But the differences are very small, about one year in each case. These figures do not suggest that the economy dichotomizes neatly into industries in which employees are the old and poorly educated, and those in which employees are young and well educated. Moreover, they do not suggest a great increase in structural unemployment as the low-technology industries contract and the high technology ones expand.
The greatest difference between the two categories involves the capital-labor ratio, and that works in a direction that is favorable to growth because lower amounts of capital are apparently required to employ labor more productively in the high-technology industries than in the low-technology ones.
However, there is good reason to doubt that the broad categories reported in table 5 capture adequately the differences between low-and high-technology activities. The data reported for two illustrative industries, steel and computers, do indeed show much greater differences in average age and educational attainment. But they also display some odd features. Their average hourly wages are respectively above and below the average wages for the broader categories, and the wage discrepancy between them can only be described as huge. These wage figures, taken naively, suggest that educational attainment has a negative return in the neighborhood of the averages, or else that seniority overwhelms educational attainment in determining one's wage. The discrepancy is so large as to suggest that wage differentials in this instance may far outweigh differences in technological prowess in determining economic performance.
But the more general point concerns the ultimate arbitrariness involved in classifying industries into broad categories. Nonferrous metals, for instance, are classified as resource-based, whereas iron and steel together are classified as capital intensive. Textiles are classified either as capital intensive or as labor intensive. Yet there have been tremendous technical improvements in textile fabrics over the past twenty years and, indeed, by 1980 the United States had become a net exporter of textiles, in part on the strength of these improvements. At the same time, much of the machinery and equipment industry, classified here as high technology, is quite traditional both in its manufacturing techniques and in its products. In actuality, high technology is potentially spread through all sectors of manufacturing-optical fibers as part of the glass industry is an example-and some firms are much more alert to the potential than others. I would conjecture that high technology plays an even greater role in U.S. trade performance than Lawrence's figures suggest. But two-or three-digit levels of classification are simply too coarse to capture accurately the full influence of new technology. , he could recognize that employment lost in that industry could be due not only to the importation of motorcycles but also of goods that would have used motorcycles and parts as inputs had they been produced at home. I Although the first of these two approaches could be more directly useful in the argumentation of those who seek to restrict imports of particular products while paying lip service to the idea of free trade elsewhere, the author chose the second approach advisedly. In doing so he provided some obstacles to abuse, but not nearly enough in my view. After all, before all but the most alert audiences, politicians can get nearly as much mileage from saying that imports of manufactured goods cut so much employment from the automobile industry as they can by claiming that automobile imports caused the loss of so much employment generally. Something is seriously wrong with all such claims, as the following example may show.
Consider the case of a country with a capital-intensive export-oriented sector and a labor-intensive import-competing sector. If one assumes that foreign demand for the output of the capital-intensive sector increases, the result will be that the relative price of products of that sector and of the factor used most intensively in the sector rises. Desired capital-to-labor ratios fall in both sectors, and labor incomes decline not only relatively but absolutely. The increase in foreign demand for a home country's exportables will lead to an appreciation of the domestic currency in real terms. If imports and import-competing goods are less than perfect substitutes in home consumption, the decline in the relative
